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Aristotle on Pure and Simple Stuff
Tiberiu Popa
Aristotle’s scientific works deserve our attention and reflection for their
intrinsic merits and revealing limitations just as much as because they clarify
other facets of the Aristotelian corpus and because they significantly shaped
almost two thousand years of science and of fields bordering on science, such
as alchemy.1 For all these reasons, then, the Stagirite’s view of the physical world
deserves to be determined with as much precision as possible. This paper is
meant to bring aspects of his worldview into sharper focus by attempting
to reconsider and to clarify a crucial Aristotelian notion: the homoeomers.
A view that has been entertained traditionally by commentators is that the
four simple bodies in the sublunary world (earth, water, air, and fire) cannot
exist independently according to Aristotle; a consequence of this view is the
general belief that all homoeomers or uniform bodies have to be compounds.2
1

2

The volume edited by Viano (Viano 2002a) as well as Newman (2006)’s
reconsideration of the place of alchemy in the context of the scientific
revolution are substantial contributions to our understanding of the Nachleben
of Meteorology IV, especially with respect to late ancient, medieval and early
modern alchemy, and the dawn of chemistry. See also Düring (1944), 10–11.
Olympiodorus (6th c. Platonist), in trying to mark out the thematic scope of
Meteor. IV, notes that it is not sufficient to consider this book to be about ta
homoiomerē; instead, we should more strictly define its central topic as the
homoeomers resulting from the combination of the four so-called elements
(272.5 ff.). A similar view was defended in modern times. In the first part of
the 20th century, Joachim, for instance, notes in his commentary on Generation
and Corruption: ‘In Aristotle’s system the homoiomerē are the first, or most
rudimentary, compound natural bodies (…). Every homoiomeres is a chemical
compound of the same four “simple” bodies (Earth, Air, Fire, Water) or – more
precisely – of the same four “elementary qualities” (Hot, Cold, Dry, Moist).
The four constituents enter into combination in a determinate quantitative
proportion, which differs in the different homoiomerē; so that each homoiomeres
is characterized by its distinctive “combining formula” (logos tēs mixeōs).’
VII.1 (2010), 29–61
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I would like to suggest that, while Aristotle consistently maintains that the
four basic opposites (hot, cold, moist, dry) cannot exist independently, this
is not always the case with the four simple bodies.3 My central claim is
that Meteorology (from now on: Meteor.) IV – Aristotle’s ‘chemical treatise’
– provides evidence that, contrary to the traditional interpretation of his
natural philosophy, not all uniform stuffs (ta homoiomerē) are necessarily
compounds of the four simple bodies or even of just earth and water; indeed,
some of them consist of only one element: earth or water. This, however, does
not prevent, for instance, bodies consisting entirely of earth from displaying
(1926), 64. Holmyard (1931), 17, in commenting on GC II.8, points out that
‘All other substances [i.e. other than earth, water, air and fire] are composed of
all the elements or “simple” bodies.’ Düring (1944), 14 too seems to consider as
indisputable that all homoeomerous bodies are compounds in Aristotle’s view.
Mugler writes in the introduction to his translation (Mugler 1966, xi) that, while
the phusika sōmata are composed of the homoeomers, the latter are composed of
the four elements. Coutant (1971), xiii notes unequivocally: ‘All terrestrial bodies
contain all four elements.’ More recently, Bolzan (1976), 139 and Freudenthal
(1995), 11 appear to have taken all the homoeomers to be combinations of
the four elements and so do Viano (2006), 122, 124 and Lewis. Lewis (1996),
144, n. 244 reacts with surprise to the distinction between simple homoeomers
and mixed ones mentioned by Alexander (in his commentary of Meteor. IV.10):
‘This distinction is confusing. It seems that a simple body is one composed of
water (and so moist), while mixed bodies are composed of water and earth,
and so thickened by cold. Yet, of course, all things are actually composed of all
four elements.’ Alexander, I should add, seems willing to persuade himself that
each homoeomer consists of a combination of all four simple bodies, despite
the fact that occasionally, as here, he cannot help virtually quoting Aristotle
who unambiguously and insistently marks a distinction between simple and
compound homoeomers.
3
	I take earth, water, air and fire to be simple in the sense that they cannot be
analyzed into simpler bodies (see, e.g., De Caelo III.3 302a16) and implicitly I agree
with Gill’s view that, while the basic contraries are crucial to our understanding
of elemental transformation (the persistent quality corresponds to matter in
substantial transformation, while the quality being replaced and the replacement
correspond to lack, sterēsis, and to form in a generic formula of change), they are
not constitutive ingredients of the aforementioned bodies. As Gill (1989), 77 notes:
‘This immunity from further division is the reason why Aristotle claims that the
elements are generated from one another. The elements must come to be from one
another because, unlike all other generated things, there is nothing simpler from
which they can be produced.’ For a detailed argument, see Gill (1989), especially
ch. 2; for an alternative view on this subject, see, e.g., Lewis (1996), 15–22.
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different behaviors among them and, so, from being divisible into distinct
kinds or forms (eidē) according to their material dispositions.4 Meteor. IV
may not be a fully polished treatise and, as a consequence, it tends to be
less consistent than one wishes it were; however, even if Aristotle was not
fully committed to the idea that, in addition to compounds, there are also
pure and simple stuffs – consisting of only one element – in the sublunary
world, at the very least it is reasonably clear, as I hope to prove, that he did
not completely reject this possibility. If my interpretation is correct, we
may need to rethink and redefine Aristotle’s concept of homoeomer, which
involves uniformity, but not necessarily a composite nature (although, again,
most of the homoeomers are indeed compounds). In short, I would like to
reexamine both the notion that all uniform bodies are compounds (of earth
and water or of all four simple bodies) and the cognate notion that elements
cannot exist on their own, but are only present in potentiality as ingredients
in chemical combinations. The last section of my paper will consider several
implications of my reexamination for Aristotle’s cosmology and theory of
mixis and separation, as well as a few additional clarifications regarding the
‘purity’ of the simple bodies and the emergence of both dispositional and
categorical properties.

4

For Aristotle’s view of what we would call today dispositional properties, see
especially his theoretical treatment of dunamis in Metaphysics Δ.12 and in Θ.
Dispositions, I should add, are still very much at the heart of modern theories
and debates in the philosophy of science, metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
Recent studies on dispositions have offered divergent views on this notion;
let me quote here two relatively uncontroversial definitions. The first one was
proposed by Tim Crane (in Crane, 1996, 1–2) and seems to echo what Aristotle
himself wrote about powers or capacities: ‘…A disposition is a property (such
as solubility, fragility, elasticity) whose instantiation entails that the thing which
has the property would change, or bring about some change, under certain
conditions. For instance, to say that some object is soluble is to say that it would
dissolve if put in water… The fragility (solubility, elasticity) is a disposition;
the breaking (dissolving, stretching) is the manifestation of the disposition…
These characteristics of the world – fragility, poisonousness, flammability,
nourishingness, loyalty, honesty, courage and humour – are all dispositions.’
And, in Goodman’s (1955), 40 suggestive formulation, we are urged to notice
that ‘Besides the observable properties it exhibits and the actual processes it
undergoes, a thing is full of threats and promises. The dispositions or capacities
of a thing – its flexibility, its inflammability, its solubility – are no less important to
us than its overt behaviour, but they strike us by comparison as rather ethereal.’
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NOTE ON THE HOMOEOMERS
AND ON THEIR PLACE IN METEOR. IV
Both the beginning and the end of Meteor. IV (chapters 1 and 12) stress
the intermediary status of the homoeomers, between the simplest bodies
(earth, water, air and fire) and the non-uniform bodies – ta anomoiomerē,
such as complex organs or parts; a hand, for instance, is made of a number
of homogeneous tissues, i.e. organic homoiomerē (see, e.g., Meteor. IV.10,
388a18–19).5 This intermediary zone does not seem to have a very prominent
position in Aristotle’s metaphysics, yet it is at least indirectly pivotal to his
metaphysics in so far as almost all substances are either uniform bodies or
aggregates of uniform bodies; and, one should hurry to add, this intermediary
domain is certainly crucial to his science and natural philosophy.
The transparent etymon of homoiomeres (‘like-parted’) is homoion
meros (‘like / similar part’). The term is generally applied to materials that
are uniform or homogeneous: a portion of the pulp of, say, an apple displays
the same basic characteristics as any other portion of the pulp of that apple.
Each part of a homoeomerous body is ‘synonymous’ with the whole. Uniform
stuffs, such as wood and stone, marrow and iron, salt and blood, appear to be
the respective results of various processes of generation, which hinge partly
on the thoroughly uniform combination of ingredients like the four so-called
elements (earth, water, air, fire) or of the two types of exhalation (dry and
moist anathumiaseis). Different ratios between such elemental constituents
and the thermic processes affecting them account largely for the enormous
variety among uniform bodies with respect to their appearance and behavior.
As we learn especially from GC I.10, the original ingredients (ta mikta) of
such uniform compounds survive in the final products potentially, some
of their original properties being still present in the resulting homoeomer,
although the process of mixis or krasis – the thoroughly uniform mixing – also
generates new, emergent properties in the resulting compound (the michthen
5

Another line of demarcation between homoeomers and anomoeomers is
generally the complexity of their respective functions. Although the organic likeparted bodies can be defined in virtue of their functions (for example, flesh as a
medium for touch, blood as a conveyor of food to the other parts of an organism
etc.), in addition to their material composition (see, e.g., GA II.1 734b30–31 and
much of its book V, and PA II), the anomoeomers (such as a hand) are generally
capable of fulfilling more complex functions and activities (erga and praxeis).
Implicitly, the simple or uniform parts are for the sake of the complex ones, of
which they are constituent parts. See also PA II.1 646b12 and Meteor. IV.12.
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or krathen). This is significantly different from earlier theories (of the pluralists
among the Presocratics, and of Plato), where uniform materials are created by
the rearrangement of elements, for instance, of minimal particles of some sort
in Democritean atomism and in Plato’s brand of atomism in the Timaeus.
According to the Aristotelian account, notably in GC I.10, we can divide
a uniform body (e.g., a piece of bark or of fat) into ever smaller pieces without
ever reaching or isolating the original constituents, since they are not actually
present in the homoeomer,6 in contrast with a mechanical mixture (of, say,
ground pepper and salt or, to take Aristotle’s example, wheat and barley) in
which the particles would preserve their defining nature. Furthermore, the
small bits into which the homoeomer has been divided will display the same
defining material properties as any other portion of that body and indeed as
that whole uniform body. This kind of similarity between part and whole (as
well as between parts within a whole) is obviously not applicable to complex
parts, such as an eye or a face. The contrast between uniform and nonuniform bodies is marked firmly in Meteor. IV, e.g., in ch. 10, at 388a13–20; as
Meteor. IV is largely devoted to the nature and formation of the homoeomers,
we would expect an explicit definition of those uniform bodies, but Aristotle
prefers to list examples rather than to offer a definition proper:7
By uniform bodies I mean, for instance, stuffs that are mined – such as
copper, gold, silver, tin, iron, stone and other such stuffs and materials
that have been separated out of them, as well as tissues that can be found

6

7

Perhaps the sole notable (possible) exception to this rule is the famous passage
in Physics I.4 (187b14–21) that spawned the theory of minima naturalia in
the Middle Ages and inspired, at least indirectly, a plethora of chemical and
quasi-chemical theories in early modern science. It is also worth adding that a
rather rare dissenting view can be found in Cooper (2004), a note on Aristotle’s
concept of mixis in GC which attempts to refute the traditional (at least since
Philoponus) thesis about ‘total interfusion’. Cooper’s interpretation allows for
the possibility that extremely small amounts of stuff could consist of pure earth
or pure water etc. in a mixture.
For similar lists of homoeomers in contexts where one would rather expect
a formal definition, see PA II.2 647b10 ff., part of a general introduction to a
mini-treatise on uniform parts, comprising PA II.4–9, and Historia Animalium
I.1 487a2–9, part of a synopsis of types of differentiae (diaphorai) among species
of animals, where Aristotle is primarily concerned with the distinction between
soft and moist uniform parts on the one hand (Peck translates hugra with ‘liquid’,
rather than ‘moist’, but lard and marrow are not exactly liquid), and solid and
dry on the other hand (sinew, skin, blood vessel, bone, horn etc.).
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in animals and in plants; for example, kinds of flesh, kinds of bone,
sinew, skin, gut, hair, fibre, veins, from which have been composed the
complex parts: face, hand, foot and the like; and uniform stuffs that can
be found in plants are wood, bark, leaf, root, and the like.8
There are two similar lists in ch. 8 (384b31–385a1) and in ch. 12 (390b3–10)
of Meteor. IV. All three passages are accompanied by reminders of how these
uniform stuffs come about (through the agency of the active factors, hot and
cold, on the passive ones, dry and moist or earth and water, in keeping with
the precepts put forth in ch. 1) and of how they can be differentiated (through
their powers or affections – dunameis or pathē: hardness, ductility etc.).
It may be useful at this point to sketch the content and purpose of Meteor.
IV, a treatise that was the object of an impressive number of commentaries
from late antiquity through late Renaissance, although it tends to be less
widely read today. Homogeneous stuffs play a cardinal role in Aristotle’s
theory of matter, especially in his discussion of chemical combination, and
are central to his explanatory apparatus in the biological corpus. Yet, it is
in Meteor. IV that we find a detailed and systematic investigation into the
nature and formation of both organic and inorganic uniform bodies. It is
worth remembering that Meteor. IV is not a book about meteorology, even
in an Aristotelian sense.9 Its position after Meteor. III may be an accident
related to the early tribulations of Aristotle’s manuscripts. It has rightly been
considered transitional from works that are primarily concerned with the
study of inorganic materials (De Caelo III–IV, GC,10 and to some extent Meteor.
Translations in this paper are mine unless otherwise indicated.
	Aristotelian meteorology covers phenomena occurring in the sublunary sphere
due chiefly to the dry and the moist exhalations and including the appearance
of the Milky Way, comets, meteors, earthquakes, and what we would consider
today to be meteorological phenomena proper (all these topics form the
substance of books I–III).
10
	Alexander (2–3 c. CE) suggested (179.3 ff.) that, as far as the subject matter
goes, Meteor. IV would more naturally come after GC (for a discussion of his
argument, see Natali (2002), 45–48. This suggestion becomes all the more
appealing if we accept, with Joachim (1926), xxxvi–xvii, that in GC Aristotle
is concerned primarily with the genesis and phthora of the homoeomers, his
discussion about the generation and destruction of the simple bodies being
relevant to the former topic in so far as the simple bodies are the proximate
constituents of the homoeomers. By contrast, Olympiodorus, agreeing roughly
with Ammonius (in Olympiodorus 6.19 ff.) argues (273.21–274.1) that book IV
is placed rather naturally after Meteor. I–III, since Aristotle must have planned
8
9
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I–III) to Aristotle’s biological works such as Parts of Animals and Generation
of Animals. This idea has become common currency with the publication of
Furley’s 1983 paper, although the point was possibly suggested by Aristotle
himself, in the first chapter of Meteor. I, a chapter that is both retrospective
and programmatic.11 Besides, in the final chapter (ch. 12) of Meteor. IV, at
389b23–2812 and 390b15–23, Aristotle explicitly states that, after dividing
homoeomers into kinds (genē) in the bulk of this book, his next task is to
consider organic homoeomers individually (kath’hekaston); a crucial factor
in determining their nature individually will be, in his biological corpus, the
use of functional accounts, involving systematic appeal to final causes.

to deal with the nature and affections of the elements in the following order:
the elements as entities not subject to generation (De caelo); the generation of
the elements (GC); ways in which the elements can be affected (the Meteorology
– presumably all four books, the fourth one simply expanding – in general
fashion – on the discussion, at the end of book III, about some of the inorganic
homoeomers, i.e. metals and stones). For a commentary on Olympiodorus’
argument, see Viano (2002), 67–69.
11
	In Meteor. I.1 (339a6 ff.) Aristotle describes the overall trajectory of his research
by saying that, after offering his explanations of meteorological phenomena, he
will provide general and particular accounts of animals and plants. Both the
‘general’ (katholou) and the ‘particular’ (chōris, kath’ hauto) approaches can be
found in Aristotle’s extant biological corpus and may have been present also in
some lost treatises on botany, especially if Theophrastus’ own works roughly
reflect the nature of their Aristotelian models. Still, Meteor. IV too is overtly
meant to offer a generic account of uniform bodies; its ‘particular’ counterpart
can be found in PA and in GA, in so far as the organic uniform parts are
concerned (and, we can conjecture, Aristotle probably also intended to give a
more detailed account of mineral uniform bodies, although, as Olympiodorus
assures us at the outset of his commentary on Meteor. IV, Aristotle never actually
carried out that project).
12
The beginning of Meteor. IV.12 (389b23–28) reads: ‘Since we have made
distinctions regarding these issues, let us say what flesh or bone or any of the
other homoeomers is separately; for we can see – by their generation – from
what elements the nature of the homoeomers has been constituted, what their
kinds are and to which kind each homoeomer pertains.’ This passage seems
almost echoed by the end of PA II.5: ‘We have stated, regarding blood, serum,
and soft and hard fat, both what each of them is, and owing to what causes each
of them is’ (trans. Lennox) and may be reminiscent of the end of Meteor. III: ‘I
have discussed then all these stuffs [i.e. metals and stones] in general, and now
I should tackle and inquire into each kind individually.’
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Thus, chapter 12 gives prominence to one of the emblematic motifs
of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. The study of organisms and of individual
parts should combine an inquiry into their material constitution (a task
largely assumed by Meteor. IV at a generic level) with an account of the
functions that essentially determine the nature of those parts (this being
fulfilled by various segments of Aristotle’s biological works). The views
expressed in ch. 12 are instrumental in our correctly placing Meteor. IV
within the Aristotelian corpus (the ‘missing link’ between works dealing with
the inorganic and works devoted essentially to biology), to fully grasping
Aristotle’s resort to conditional necessity and to our correctly assessing the
role of the homoeomerous bodies within a biological context.
However, the actual, dominant achievement of Meteor. IV lies elsewhere:
most of the fourth book (chs. 1–11) is devoted to the study and division
of kinds of homoeomers (or homogeneous stuffs, uniform bodies) and of
various effects of heat and cold on such uniform stuffs – an enterprise that
will turn out to be profitable in the study of simple and complex ‘parts’ in
treatises like PA, where Aristotle does not have to embark on lengthy and
detailed inquiries into the nature of uniform bodies every time he considers
the material nature of some tissue, such as blood or flesh. Instead, he can
conveniently glimpse back, as it were, at his earlier investigation in Meteor. IV
and, based on the perceptible properties of some tissue, he can presumably
determine its composition: watery, mostly earthy etc.13 PA II and GA V,14 to
mention only the most obvious examples, contain numerous such details
that appear to draw on Meteor. IV.

THE OFFICIAL DOCTRINE:
ALL HOMOEOMERS ARE COMPOUNDS
I have emphasized some of the connections between the GC theory of mixis
and the Meteor. IV discussion about ta homoiomerē not only in order to stress
the complementariness – in key respects – of these two texts, but also to
This is in keeping with the ‘economical’ approach that – as Lennox (2001) has
demonstrated – is displayed within the PA itself: Aristotle starts, in PA II, with an
investigation into the nature of uniform parts, before engaging in a discussion
of non-uniform parts in books III, IV (had he done otherwise, he would have
had to account for the nature of tissues when tackling each complex organ).
14
	However, Historia Animalium III (largely devoted to the uniform parts of
blooded animals) exhibits virtually no interest in the ‘chemical’ composition of
the organic uniform stuffs.

13
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introduce a passage from GC that is central to my argument. In this locus
classicus, Aristotle reveals the scope of his discussion about uniform stuffs
and, implicitly, its relevance to his natural philosophy and his science. It turns
out that not only are genuine chemical combinations thoroughly uniform,
but these uniform stuffs, which encompass the whole realm of nature,
contain (dunamei,15 of course) all four simple bodies – earth, water, air, and
fire. We have to assume that this is the case, whether the actual uniform
compounds in the sublunary world were the result of the blending of simple
bodies or of other uniform compounds (e.g., bronze, an alloy of copper and
tin) whose composition could in turn be analyzed ultimately into the four
simple bodies. Ch. 7 of GC II provides an account of how simple bodies can
mix to form homogeneous compounds displaying emergent properties that
are generated at various points along the hot-cold and moist-dry continua;
the next segment, ch. 8, is meant to indicate how pervasive this phenomenon,
mixis, is and to prefigure some of the points that will be developed in chs. 9
and 10 (on the causes of coming to be and passing away). Here is the opening
passage of GC II.8:
All the mixed bodies (ta mikta), the ones that are around the central
region, are composed of all the simple bodies. For earth exists in all
[compounds in the central region] because each [simple body, including
earth] exists chiefly and in greatest supply in its proper place, while water
[can be found in all compounds in the central region] because what is
a compound (to suntheton) must be delimited, and among the simple
bodies only water is easily delimitable, and, moreover, even earth could
not hold together without the moist, which is what keeps it together; for,
if the moist were completely removed from it, it would fall apart. Thus, it
is for these reasons that earth and water exist in [bodies that are around
the central region], whereas air and fire [can be found in them] because
15

	A recent and careful comparison between the GC account of mixis and Meteor.
IV is provided by Viano (2006). She rejects Joachim’s interpretation (1926),
176, 180–181, which follows Philoponus and Zabarella, namely that dunamis in
this context should be understood as a sort of diminished second potentiality,
similar to a drunk geometer’s diminished ability to solve a problem. Instead,
Viano (2006), 126 suggests that what Aristotle must have had in mind were the
sort of intrinsic dunameis listed and defined in chapters 8 and 9 of Meteor. IV:
liquefiable, breakable, splittable, combustible etc. She adds that such qualities are
due to some extent to the thermic processes which contributed to the mixing
and to the formation of a new uniform body. This is certainly sensible but does
not completely dispel the fog shrouding the use of dunamei here.
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they are contraries of earth and water (for earth is the contrary of air
and water of fire, in so far as a substance can be the contrary of another
substance).16
Aristotle’s formulations are typically elliptic and the passage is
occasionally baffling (e.g., ta mikta and to suntheton appear to be used
synonymously here despite the fact that the two terms correspond to
concepts – mixis and sunthesis – that are markedly distinct in GC I.10 as
they correspond to chemical combination and to aggregation or mechanical
mixture respectively). Besides, it is not clear that everything in the sublunary
region is composed of all four simple bodies, given that all of these claims
appear to be qualified by the formula ‘around the central region’ (the contrast
is obviously with what is closer to the orbit of the moon but still in the
sublunary sphere, which raises potentially interesting questions about the
two exhalations, as we shall see in the final section of this paper).
Still, the drift of the passage is clear enough and I think Williams (1982),
51 is quite right in entitling his translation of ch. 8 ‘Each Element Present
in Every Homoeomer’. The first sentence of ch. 8 may seem somewhat
ambiguous, since the sum total of the compound bodies (around the central
body, i.e. earth) could consist of all four simple bodies, without this entailing
necessarily that each uniform compound contains all four simple bodies in a
certain proportion; this possible ambiguity, however, is dispelled by the next
sentences. Different reasons are offered for the presence of (a) earth, (b) water
and (c) air and fire in all the homoeomers situated in the proximity of the
Earth. The ubiquitous presence of earth in the central region of the universe
is due to its abundance in its natural place; water is necessary for the cohesion
of all uniform bodies and their acquisition of definite shapes;17 air and fire
too are present in all homoeomers, since, as we learn from the next few lines,
comings about are due to contraries (hai geneseis ek tōn enantiōn eisin). What
Aristotle must have in mind here is that substances (ousiai), specifically
the four simple bodies, are conceivable as contraries in so far as they are
characterized by opposite pairs of basic qualities (dry and cold, i.e. earth vs
moist and hot, i.e. air; moist and cold, i.e. water vs dry and hot, i.e. fire) and
are theoretically reducible to four dominant properties: water to cold and fire

16
17

334b31–335a6.
Regarding the adaptability in shape of the moist, see GC II.2 329b31, Meteor. IV.4
381b28–30.
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to hot; air to moist and earth to dry.18 While the reasons for the presence of
earth and water in all compounds sound reasonable within the bounds of
Aristotle’s cosmology, the one offered for the notion that air and fire too must
be found dunamei in all compounds is less cogent. The illustration meant to
bolster his point is that each compound is nourished by an array of things
partly similar to its constitution (for instance, plants need both water and
earth, 335b11–14; cf. GA III.11 762b12), although it is notable that air and
fire are not mentioned in this example. Judging by its larger context, this
argument for the presence of fire and air in all compounds is chiefly but
perhaps not exclusively an expedient intended to ensure a smooth transition
to the distinction made in chs. 9 and 10 between the four types of causation.
In light of chs. 9 and 10, Aristotle’s ch. 8 glimpse at the compounds around the
center of the universe acquires greater significance: it points out the effect of
the principal efficient cause responsible for the phenomena in the sublunary
world – the sun’s continuous movement along the ecliptic (ch. 10).
I will pass over the metaphysical significance of ch. 8, interesting though
it might be (involving the preservation of the matter-form unity and the
distinction between nourishment which is essentially matter and that which
gets nourished, namely the shape or form taken together with matter), since my
goal here is rather to bring attention to and to briefly analyze crucial passages
where Aristotle argues for the ‘official doctrine’ that all (uniform) compounds
are chemical combinations. Let me now tackle another such passage, which
shares much with the one that I have just examined. As I mentioned before,
ta homoiomerē are not defined explicitly and technically in Meteor. IV, but the
passage that comes closest to offering a definition is the following one:
… Heat exists in all bodies because they are crafted by [heat and cold],
and cold exists in some in so far as the heat is lacking. So, since these are
present in virtue of their being active, moist and dry in virtue of their
being passive, the mixed bodies (ta koina) partake of them all. Therefore,
the homoeomers consist of both water and earth, in the case of plants
and animals, and, as for stuffs that are mined, such as gold, silver and
the like, they consist of [earth and water] as well as of the enclosed
exhalation pertaining to each of the two [i.e. to earth and to water], as
has been mentioned elsewhere (IV.8 384b26-385a1).19
18

19

This conforms to GC II.3 331a1–6, but may be slightly problematic for Aristotle
since it is ‘water’ and ‘the moist’ / ‘moisture’ (rather than ‘cold’) that are used
interchangeably in this very passage and throughout Meteor. IV.
See Meteor. III.6.
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These lines are intended to preface a division of (especially solid)
homoeomers based on intrinsic or primary dispositional properties –
breakable stuffs, flammable stuffs etc., as opposed to a possible division along
the lines of colors and other essentially perceptible properties. The idea that
all simple bodies are present in all homoeomers is slightly attenuated here,
since Aristotle notes that all four basic opposites (hot, cold, moist, dry)20 along
with only two of the simple bodies, earth and water, and the exhalations
(presumably in the case of stones and metals alone) are present in the
homoeomers. Yet, even if he is not concerned here with air and fire as quasiuniversal ingredients,21 the discrepancy with the passage from GC II.8 may
only be apparent (after all, even in GC II.8 only earth and water are explicitly
named as ‘nourishment’ for plants). In any case, this possible discrepancy
is not particularly troubling, given that Aristotle’s ‘chemistry’ in Meteor. IV
Cf. PA 646a14 ff. For a helpful discussion about Aristotle’s apparent hesitation
between treating the homoeomers as compounds of simple bodies and
regarding them as consisting of dry, moist and the other basic opposites, see
Rashed (2005), cxxvi–cxxix and passim.
21
	Alexander (213.10–12) believes that Aristotle must have meant that uniform
compound bodies are combinations of all four simple bodies and that Aristotle
may have mentioned only earth and water here because they tend to predominate
in homoeomers. This is less than obvious, though, from the text and its context.
There are also other passages that suggest that air and fire are only scantily
present in most homoeomers, if at all (thus at 382a7 ff. Aristotle points out that
animals live only on land and in water, which are also the stuffs from which
organisms are constituted, but not in air or fire, which seems to imply that air and
fire are largely absent, with some exceptions, from their material constitution;
by the way, in GC II 7, 334b5 Aristotle does speak, albeit tentatively, about fire
and earth as the ingredients of flesh, but he apparently takes his own example
cum grano salis). Frede (2004), 311 suggests that ‘The special importance that is
attributed to two of the simple bodies, namely earth and water [i.e. in Meteor.
IV] clearly comes from the need to keep simple the basic principles that underlie
the wide variety of phenomena.’ That Aristotle simplifies his chemical formulas,
so to speak, for the sake of clarity and simplicity would be a more convincing
suggestion if he referred exclusively to earth and water in Meteor. IV; yet when
a reference to air is required by the explanation of the behavior of certain stuffs
(oil, wood etc.), he mentions it without hesitation. His overall division into
kinds of stuffs would likely not become very complicated if he were to also
invoke air as an elemental constituent more systematically. I submit that the
main (not necessarily the only) reason why he does not do so is because such
homoeomers form a relatively small set – in so far as he ventures to determine
the airy nature of certain uniform materials.
20
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and in his biological corpus relies heavily on the ratio between earth and
water or dry and moist in the uniform stuffs, whereas air and fire play a
much more discreet role there. More importantly, both passages contend
that the four basic opposites (not just the simple bodies resulting from their
pairings) must be present in all homoeomers. Finally, the exhalations (not
mentioned in GC, but pivotal in Meteor. I–III and looming in the background
of Meteor. IV) are probably nothing but the simple bodies at various stages in
their process of transformation (more on this, later in this paper), one of the
exhalations being smoky or fiery, the other one being moist.
The inferential oun, ‘therefore’, after ‘the homoeomerous bodies’ implies
not only that all compound bodies include (dunamei) moist and dry or water
and earth, but also that (all the)22 homoeomerous bodies are compounds. If so,
he means that each and every type of homoeomer includes all four opposites,
rather than that one can find all four opposites in the sum total of homoeomers,
without it being necessary that all four opposites be present in each and every
type of homoeomer (although note that cold – as an active factor, not as mere
privation – is present in some, tisi, maybe not all, uniform bodies).
This seems largely to square with GC II.8 as well as with the passage
in ch. 4 of Meteor. IV (381b24–382a4) where Aristotle reminds us that the
passive principles of physical bodies are the moist and the dry (hugron kai
xēron) and that ‘the other things’ are combinations of dry and moist. He
curiously enlists Empedocles in his service, quoting from his poem On
Nature (‘gluing the barley meal with water’, 382a1) a passage which conveys
the idea that water is necessary for ensuring cohesion and for preventing
solids from disintegrating.23 His next comment seems to qualify his initial,
apparently universal, claim (covering all homoeomers, solid and liquid), by
saying that ‘definite bodies’ (hōrismena sōmata), which presumably refers only
to solids,24 include both water and earth in their composition. Even so, this
passage, along with the ones I quoted from GC II.8 and Meteor. IV.8, argues
quite firmly for the view that all the homoeomers are compounds and that at
the very least they include earth and water (dunamei) if not all four simple
bodies – and thus all four basic opposites.

22

23
24

Cf. below, ek men oun hudatos kai gēs ta homoiomerē sōmata sunistatai… Like
koina above, homoiomerē has the definite article ta, which possibly adds the
strength of a generic or even universal claim.
This reinforces the thesis proposed in GC I.10 as well as Meteor. IV.8.
See on this Düring (1944), 78.
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As I have already mentioned, this is also the orthodox view generally
embraced by commentators when tackling the nature of the homoeomers.
The problem is that Aristotle himself is far less consistent in this respect than
he may seem to be and the fluidity of dominant aspects of his conception
of uniform stuffs – a work in progress, one might say – will hopefully be
apparent from the following list of passages.

NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS
There is strong evidence in Meteor. IV that Aristotle was not fully committed
to his own theory that all homoeomerous bodies are composed of the four
simple bodies or at least of both earth and water, after all. It turns out that
some uniform stuffs consist of only one element, specifically only of earth or
only of water. Here is a list of examples from Meteor. IV (in the order in
which they appear there) which, I believe, call into question the tempting but
perhaps false view that Aristotle consistently considered all uniform bodies
to be compounds and, furthermore, considered them to be combinations of
all four simple bodies or at least of earth and water in various proportions.

1. Absence of water / moist (pure earth?)
Ch. 3 of Meteor. IV includes a discussion of boiling (hepsēsis), 380b13–
381a12, which is a type of concoction (pepsis) that affects the properties of
homoeomers through the moist heat of the undetermined stuff present in
the moisture of a homoeomer. In this context, we find that there are uniform
bodies that cannot be boiled because they contain no moisture at all (a rather
emphatic formula: en hōi mēden estin hugron, 380b25), for instance certain
stones, or contain moisture but are too dense to be boiled, for instance wood.
Therefore, certain kinds of stones appear to be completely devoid of water
and probably to consist only of earth, although this does not seem to prevent
them from maintaining their cohesion, which contradicts some of the claims
made in GC II.8 and in Meteor. IV.4.
In ch. 6 Aristotle deals, among other things, with solidification as a result
of the complete evaporation of water from a compound, a process that is
responsible, for example, for the production of baked clay (383a20–21, cf.
383b11): ‘Therefore, things that are soft but are not moist do not thicken but
solidify, as the moist leaves them, for instance baked clay (optōmenos keramos).’
There is no qualification implied in this process of evaporation, which likely
suggests that what is left – namely, baked clay – lacks moisture altogether and
perhaps is ‘pure’ earth, paradoxically displaying, besides cohesion, a specific
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set of secondary dispositional differentiae. This reading is supported by the
end of ch. 7 (384b20–22) where Aristotle affirms that baked clay consists of
earth only (gēs monon).
In ch. 8, in a succinct discussion of solidification, Aristotle notes (385a28–
31) that ‘Some stuffs are dissolved by the moist because the moist is absent
[from their constitution] (hugrou apousiāi), unless they have contracted such
that their pores have been left too small for the particles of water [to penetrate
them], which is the case, for example, with [baked] clay; yet, if this is not so
[i.e., if their pores do not prevent water from entering], they are all dissolved
by the moist, for instance, soda, salt and mud reduced to earth.’ A few lines
further (385b1–3), he speaks again of uniform stuffs that are devoid of watery
moisture: ‘Incapable of solidification are those stuffs that do not have watery
moisture (hosa mē echei hugrotēta hudatōdē) and do not consist of water (mēde
hudatos estin) but consist more of the hot and of earth, for example honey
and must (for they are in the process of boiling, as it were)…’
At the beginning of ch. 9, in a passage (385b6–12) dealing with things
that are softenable by heat (ta malakta) we learn that this material disposition
is present in uniform bodies that contain predominantly earth, but not
only earth as it is the case with soda and salt, from which all moisture has
evaporated (exikmastai pan) and thus end up containing only earth;25 also,
if a body is to be softenable by heat, its moisture must not be present in
disproportionately small quantity, like in potter’s clay (to be understood:
unbaked clay), keramos. Significant here is the sharp distinction between
earthy bodies that include a very small amount of moisture and those that
truly lack any moisture whatsoever, which, given the absence of references to
fire and air, indicates the possibility that some bodies are made just of earth.
In ch. 10, at 388b12–24, Aristotle distinguishes solids that contain only
earth both from solids that contain only water (e.g., ice) and from solids
which are predominantly earthy but from which moisture has not evaporated
completely. Here is the passage on what appear to be purely earthy solids:
…Those stuffs [that are solidified] by heat, consist of earth, for instance
clay, cheese, soda, salt; those which are solidified by both [heat and cold]
consist of both [earth and water] (such are the stuffs solidified by cooling,
as a result of the lack of both heat and moist; for salt and [the other] stuffs

25

Cf. ch. 9 in book VII of Problems (whose authorship is a notoriously thorny issue,
although it generally includes reflections on genuinely Peripatetic theories),
where salt, dust and niter are suggested to lack moisture.
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that are made purely of earth (hosa eilikrinē gēs)26 solidify solely due to the
lack of the moist, while ice solidifies only due to the lack of heat). For this
reason they are solidified by both [heat and cold] and contain both [earth
and water]. Those stuffs from which [the moist] has been evaporated
entirely (hapan exikmasthē), such as [baked] clay and amber – all of them
consist of earth (for amber as well as the stuffs called ‘tears’ exist due
to a process of cooling, e.g., myrrh, frankincense and gum; amber too
seems to belong to this kind and is the result of solidification as indeed
demonstrated by the animals trapped in it; the hot, forced to leave by the
[cold water of] the river evaporates the moisture, as it happens with the
natural heat of boiled honey, when dropped into water).
Just as water or moisture seems to be completely absent from certain
homoeomers, judging by a number of generally unequivocal comments in
Meteor. IV, earth is absent from others, as we can see from the following list.

	Instances of such genitive can also be found in PA, e.g., at 650b18 and 651a8. This
rather curious genitive accompanied by einai or implying an einai occasionally
suggests a predominant (rather than exclusive) ingredient; for example, wood
consists of earth and air (ch. 7, 384b15–16: ta de xula estin gēs kai aeros), although
not exclusively, since we know – and Aristotle makes this point in no uncertain
terms – that wood is also composed of water or the moist. On other occasions,
however, this type of genitive seems to simply indicate an exclusive rather than
just a predominant ingredient; e.g., at 10, 389a1–2: stuffs dissolved by water
consist of earth (tauta de gēs), whereas stuffs that are not dissolved or melted by
either water or fire consist of earth or of both (tauta ē gēs ē amphoin); in this case,
logic would dictate that gēs, as opposed to amphoin, means ‘only of earth’, unless
by amphoin Aristotle does not mean just ‘water and earth’ but ‘water and earth in
a rather balanced ratio’, which would leave open the possibility that gēs is roughly
the semantic equivalent of ‘mainly of earth, in a composition in which water is
in disproportionately low amount’. Such an interpretation, however, while not
entirely impossible, does not appear to be warranted by the text of Meteor. IV.
That this type of genitive + einai (or implying einai) is unlikely to always mean
‘predominantly of (earth / water)’ is also suggested by Aristotle’s addition of pleon
or mallon to the genitive (which would be superfluous if the genitive itself would
already imply predominance in such contexts): 383b20, 384a12, 385b3 etc. On the
other hand, this type of genitive clearly does not always indicate an exclusive
ingredient either, since sometimes Aristotle feels compelled to add haplōs or
monon for the sake of clarity (e.g., PA II.2 649a31 ff).

26
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2. Absence of earth / dry (pure water?)
According to ch. 3, 380a34 both dry and moist are necessary for the process
of concoction (marked in part by thickening of the organic uniform body
undergoing that change), concoction being one of the most pervasive organic
processes in nature, according to the Stagirite. A similar point is made again
in ch. 6 (383a11–13): ‘For this reason, such stuffs [i.e. those consisting of
water] do not thicken when they are solidified, for thickening occurs when
the moist departs and the dry becomes more compact; water (hudōr) alone
among liquids does not thicken.’ Lee, who translates hudōr with ‘watery
liquids’ is probably right to assume that hudōr is not just ‘water’ here; in any
case, water and watery liquids, while not identical, are close enough to display
very similar dispositional qualities (see, for instance, ch. 5 of Meteor. IV).
Implied here is the possibility that certain liquids lack earth (or dry). This
passage in ch. 6 comes in the context of a survey of conditions that cause
the liquefaction and solidification of the stuffs consisting of water (hosa
hudatos, 383a7), as well as of combinations of earth and water (hosa de koina
gēs kai hudatos, 383a14). Since these two types of uniform stuffs are clearly
distinguished here, the first one (see especially 383a7–13) can be taken to
refer to liquid uniform stuffs that are not compounds consisting of earth and
water and probably contain water alone (maybe at slightly different points
along the continua between the basic opposites, which might explain the
distinction between water and various forms of water or watery liquids).
Ch. 10, much like ch. 6, appears to convey the notion that there are liquids
(apparently distinguishable from each other) that are made entirely of water
(388a30 ff.), their general and chief mark being a dispositional differentia:
they tend to evaporate easily (stuffs that are less liable to evaporate consist
of earth or of a combination of earth and water, like milk; or of earth and
air, like honey;27 or water and air, like oil). A few lines further into the same
ch. 10 (388b9 ff.), we read that stuffs, such as oil and sweet wine, which are
thickened both by heat and by cold consist of several constituents or simple
bodies (koina pleionōn). By implication, this passage allows for the existence
of bodies made of only one element, including those that consist only of
water. This impression is strengthened by the conclusion at 389a3–6:
If, then, all stuffs are either liquid or solid (and the stuffs characterized by
the qualities just discussed are among these [i.e. liquids and solids]) and
there is nothing in between, then all the properties have been discussed
27

	If we are to accept Vimercati’s reading; see Lee (1952), 360, note b.
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through which we can determine whether a stuff consists of earth or of
water or is a compound consisting of several [simple bodies] (ē pleionōn
koinon), and whether it has been constituted by fire or by cold or by both.
Finally, let me mention a passage in ch. 11 (at 389a29–b7) which reminds
us that cold is not simply a privation (of warmth), but in a way it is also
matter; among other things, he notes here that cold is a common and
defining characteristic of earth and water and, consequently, bodies which
consist of either element alone (hekaterou haplōs tou stoicheiou) – earth and
water, which best exemplify the dry and the moist – are rather cold. As for
compounds (hosa de koina), they tend to be warm. All this seems to indicate
that some homoeomers consist of only one element, for example, just of
earth or just of water.
This is not an exhaustive list of such examples, but I hope that it is
sufficient to show that Aristotle’s theory regarding the nature of homoeomers
is more tentative than generally assumed and may occasionally entail serious
cases of inconsistency within his treatment of matter.28 One is left with
the strong impression that Aristotle’s theory of matter was still a work in
progress when he was writing Meteor. IV – certainly more so than modern
commentaries tend to state or imply. Perhaps this should not come as an
utter surprise, since, among other things, his Meteor. IV is not obviously or
thoroughly coherent,29 and its extant form seems to be the result of successive
revisions by the Stagirite.
In the passages that I have listed and briefly analyzed here he makes
several general claims, which are complementary and sometimes coextensive:
28

29

The impression of inconsistency cannot be dispelled by questioning the
authorship of Meteor. IV. Lee (1952), Furley (1989), Lewis (1996) and others
have put any doubts about the authorship of this book to rest convincingly
and, I think, definitively. It would also be implausible to take those passages to
be interpolations in an otherwise Aristotelian text, since they are central to the
explanation of so many specific phenomena discussed in Meteor. IV and of the
division of the homoeomers according to their chemical constitution, physical
microstructure and to their dispositions.
To mention just a few puzzles related to the structure and content of Meteor.
IV: How are chapters 2 and 3 (dealing with concoction and inconcoction, pepsis
and apepsia) to be connected with the subsequent chapters of this book? Why
did he devote two sections (chs. 5–7 and ch. 10) to the ratio between earth and
water in various homoeomers? How is the sole mention of the exhalations in
Meteor. IV (384b33) to be reconciled with the rest of the explanatory apparatus
(relying on references to water and earth or moist and dry)?
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a) earth or water could be absent from the composition of certain uniform
stuffs; b) some homoeomers consist of only one simple body, while others
are compounds; c) more specifically, there are homogeneous stuffs that
consist only of earth or only of water. Meteor. IV, as we have seen, seems to
indicate that pure stuffs can only be found among inorganic homoeomers;
the organic ones seem to always be compounds, involving a higher degree
of chemical complexity and the presence of internal heat, emphuton thermon.
Some of these passages are more explicit than others, but, considered both
individually and as a collection, they point rather emphatically to the
possibility that not all homoeomers are compounds (and that at least some of
the uniform compounds do not consist of all four simple bodies, but maybe
just of earth and water). Thus, quite a few passages in Meteor. IV signal a
distinction between two sorts of uniform bodies – uniform compounds
and simple or pure stuffs (actually consisting only of water or only of
earth, in contrast with the potential presence of simple bodies in chemical
combinations).30 This entails that a universal definition of the homoeomers
should not include a reference to composite nature (although it is clear from
the examples discussed by Aristotle in Meteor. IV, PA II, GA V etc. that most
homoeomers are indeed compounds). Furthermore, this is not simply an
isolated and whimsical point, subsequently disavowed in Aristotle’s works;
quite to the contrary, in the biological works, in passages clearly echoing
Meteor. IV,31 he still seems to maintain that some uniform stuffs consist of
only one simple body.
30

31

Remarkably, this distinction seems to correspond, on a higher level of
complexity, to the differentiation that Aristotle makes explicitly between types
of anomoeomers or non-uniform parts (PA II.1 646b30–32): ‘…The non-uniform
parts are capable of having been composed from the uniform parts, both from
many of them and from one, as with some of the viscera; they are complex in
configuration, though generally speaking they are composed of one uniform
body (polumorpha gar tois schēmasin ex homoiomerous onta sōmatos hōs eipein
haplōs)’ (trans. Lennox).
See, e.g., PA II.2 649a31–33, hosa hudatos monon…hosa de gēs, ‘the stuffs made
only of water…the stuffs made [by implication: only] of earth’; the significance of
this qualification (monon) is further emphasized by another and quite different
qualifier (mallon in hosa gēs mallon, the stuffs consisting mainly of earth). Now,
it is empirically evident that even compounds in which water predominates,
but is not exclusively present, will be solidified by cold, but Aristotle does not
appear to have thought of compounds when he used monon. What is also
noteworthy in this passage is that it undoubtedly reflects Meteor. IV and the
law-like statements one can find there (in this case: stuffs composed solely of
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If I am right that earth and water can exist separately anywhere in the
sublunary sphere, whether diffusely and amorphously or as lumps or, more
intriguingly, as artifacts (albeit probably not as tissues or parts of animals),
then a number of additional questions pertaining to the nature and formation
of the homoeomers need to be answered – and that is the task that I will
assume in the next and final section of this paper.

RELATED PROBLEMS AND TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS
So far I have attempted to prove that Aristotle’s claim regarding the
combination of the four (sublunary) simple bodies is often decidedly more
relaxed than many of his modern commentators seem to assume. It should be
clear by now, I hope, that not all homoeomerous bodies include all four simple
bodies dunamei (in various ratios); moreover, their nature does not appear
to even reflect Aristotle’s more qualified statement in Meteor. IV.8, where he
explicitly posits the necessary presence of water and earth in all uniform
stuffs (along with the exhalations, in some of them). In short, Aristotle does
not appear to have settled on a definitive theory in this respect, leaving wide
open the possibility that uniform stuffs could consist of combinations of
only some of the four simple bodies or, in some cases, could indeed consist
of only one such body. Assuming that this is correct, I would like now to
consider three adjacent issues: How are homoeomers consisting, e.g., only of
earth (amber, myrrh, salt etc.) generated? What is a pure stuff, given rather
puzzling categories of uniform stuffs, such as the exhalations and forms of
earth or water, and a possible distinction between ‘theoretical elements’ and
‘practical elements’?32 How can one account for different behaviors among
uniform bodies consisting of the same one element (e.g., earth)?

32

water are solidified by cold, whereas stuffs consisting – presumably only – of
earth are solidified by heat or by fire). This supports my view that Aristotle’s
frequent references to pure earth and pure water do not form an aspect that
pertains idiosyncratically to his theory of matter in Meteor IV and was duly
abandoned after Meteor. IV had been written, but a feature that is profitably
utilized in later writings, such as PA. He points out in this very passage that he
previously discussed such dispositional differentiae more clearly elsewhere – en
heterois – and, again, this is a fairly clear reference to Meteor. IV, as Peck (1937),
128, note a: ‘See Meteor. 382b31 ff., 388b10 ff.’ and Lennox (2001), 195: ‘Cf. Meteor.
IV.6 383a26–b17, and 7 384b2–23’, plausibly point out.
The terminology of a distinction of ‘theoretical elements’ and ‘practical elements’
is from Bolzan (1986), 135.
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I. If homoeomers consisting of only one
simple body are possible, how are they generated?
Some of the homogeneous stuffs that, according to Aristotle, consist only of water
or only of earth clearly start out as compounds of earth and water. An example
is keramos or (unbaked) potter’s clay, which loses its moisture entirely as a result
of a drastic process of separation of water from that combination, when clay is
exposed to intense heat in the kiln and the external heat drives off the internal
heat along with the moisture (more specifically, the moisture is thoroughly
eliminated from clay, through a peculiar kind of transpiration, followed by
evaporation proper). In the case of natural stuffs like salt, it is likely that natural
evaporation (e.g., of moisture from brine) led to the formation of homoeomers
consisting entirely of earth. Aristotle tells us explicitly that evaporation (due to
the expulsion of internal heat and moisture by cold) accounts for the formation
of amber, myrrh, frankincense and gum, which presumably contain no water.
Mixis remains important in this context, but it is the process of separation that
ultimately leads (under specific thermic conditions) to the eventual formation of
a uniform stuff consisting of only one element.
As I have mentioned, Aristotle’s treatment of uniform bodies or ta
homoiomerē relies heavily on the theory of mixis outlined in GC I.10, where
Aristotle points out (328a11–12) that genuine composition must be uniform
(to michthen homoiomeres einai). He goes on to say that, just as a part of water
is water, any part of a uniform compound should be a uniform compound
(i.e. of the same kind as the whole). If such a homogeneous blend – for
instance between liquids like water and wine – is to be possible, a number
of conditions have to obtain: among other things, ‘When there is a certain
equilibrium among their potencies (tais dunamesin), each one changes
from its own nature to the one that dominates, and does not become the
other, but rather becomes something in between and common [to both of
them]’ (328a29–31). Finally, the stuffs to be mixed must display contrariety
(enantiōsin echei, GC I.10 328a32, cf. GC I.7–9), since they should be able to act
on each other. GC II.2, 7 and Meteor. IV will flesh out these conditions, which
are only sketched in GC I.10, and will deal in expectedly qualitative fashion
(or, one might say, in vaguely quantitative fashion, by appealing to the more
and the less) with the correlation between the ratio among the constituents
and the defining properties of the resulting uniform combination.
Still, the question remains: why does thorough mixing not involve
passing away?
Part of the answer lies obviously in the mutual alteration of the
corresponding qualities belonging to the mixable bodies; as a result of this

50

Tiberiu Popa

peculiar type of alteration (in which each ingredient plays the dual role of
agent and patient), the constituents are unified into a compound which
displays a certain balance between the respective original qualities of those
constituents (rather than those qualities being utterly eliminated or replaced
etc.). This, however, may not be a complete answer. Another part of the answer
can be detected in Aristotle’s wording and in the structure of that important
passage in GC I.10. After contending, at 327b23 ff., that the ingredients persist
dunamei33 in the new compound and have not perished (ouk apolōlota), he
reminds us that this is a difficulty he faced earlier (viz. how is mixing possible
if the ingredients disappear etc.) and points out that the original constituents
existed separately before being combined thoroughly into a uniform body
and can be separated again (dunamena chōrizesthai palin). In other words,
mixis is a reversible process. Finally, he slightly reformulates his first point
by saying that the original bodies and their qualities are not destroyed (oute
phtheirontai), but rather their capacity is preserved (sōzetai gar hē dunamis
autōn). Given the emphatic reference to separation, which connects the
two formulations of this central point about mixis, and perhaps, to a lesser
extent, the use of dunamena between the two occurrences of dunamis,
Aristotle seems to suggest that what prevents mixis from being a form of
phthora is that the original ingredients can in principle be recovered (and
thus their dunameis can be fully restored). The constitutive ingredients of a
uniform compound can be themselves compounds (tin and copper could be
separated from bronze), but if (some of) the ingredients are simple bodies,
then a compound homoeomer could, through some form of separation,
be reduced to pure earth and pure water. All textual indications are that
Aristotle meant such a process, and that his talk about separation was not to
be taken merely abstractly or theoretically (as, for instance, one could only
theoretically analyze, say, earth into dry and cold).34
The use of dunamei in the GC I.10 treatment of mixis is curiously echoed by
Meteor. II.9 369a13–15 in a discussion about exhalations, which are always
mixed together in various ratios.
34
	Alexander explains this type of separation as a reverse process of alteration,
involving specific effects of the active factors – heat or cold – among other
things, and even offers some rather interesting experimental proof (De mixtione,
231.30–232.12). As he puts it (in Todd’s translation, 1976, 157): ‘…[S]o must it
be understood that agents which separate constituents from which blends have
been formed also do not separate what is actually inherent in [blends] but cause
an alteration by a specific force [dunamei tini], and actualise bodies that as a
result of blending are present in them in potentiality.’
33
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Elements can, then, exist in pure form, for instance as a result of such –
natural or artificial – separation. Still, maybe a qualification becomes necessary
here: pure earth (in its various forms or eidē), while not a compound, is not
to be confused, on the other hand, with a certain paradigmatic notion of
earth that may indeed be purely theoretical. If it is such ‘theoretical elements’
(rather than their empirical manifestations) that Aristotle had in mind when
proclaiming that simple bodies cannot exist on their own, then there may still
appear to be a way of reconciling those statements (in GC II.8 and Meteor. IV.
4 and 8) with the plethora of passages in Meteor. IV where the Stagirite insists
on the complete absence of earth or water from certain homoeomers and on
their purity. However, trying to do away with any contradiction between the
two sets of passages because presumably the first one centers exclusively on
‘theoretical elements’ and the second series is concerned only with ‘practical
elements’ seems to me an implausible solution, since it is far from clear that
in GC II.8 and Meteor. IV.4 and 8, in passages that I discussed in connection
with the ‘official doctrine’, Aristotle actually referred strictly to that purely
theoretical notion of elements. Therefore, the inconsistency that I pointed
out in Aristotle’s discussion of pure elements and their separate existence
still stands and is likely due to his revision of his own theory and to the
fact that, as far as Meteor. IV is concerned, it was never polished to a degree
that would render it a robustly unified and thoroughly consistent treatise.
While I cannot detect any explicit or implicit proof in the Greek text that
such a distinction is made in the passages I discussed in connection with the
‘official doctrine’, that distinction is indeed made elsewhere in both GC and
the Meteorology and it raises potentially interesting questions related to my
discussion about pure stuffs.

II. What does it mean for a simple body to be truly pure?
What are the forms of earth and water
and what are the exhalations?
I believe that a comparison between presumably pure stuffs (forms of earth
and of water) and the exhalations (in the atmosphere, underground and in
materials that have been mined) is a profitable angle from which we can
tackle these questions. Elemental transformations are not sudden but gradual,
given the continua between the four fundamental opposites.35 It is possible,
35

For a discussion about these continua and the notion of meson as put to work
in the context of the formation of the homoeomers, see Bolzan (1986), 142.
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therefore, that this could explain why there are different forms of, say, earth,
depending on where they are situated along the continua between cold/dry
and cold/moist. It is potentially significant that Aristotle uses expressions
like ‘forms (or kinds) of water’ and ‘forms (or kinds) of earth’36 which seem
to echo similar formulations (if not the treatments of this notion) in the
Timaeus37 and in several Hippocratic writings,38 and which seem to indicate
that, paradoxically, different stuffs can be made of the same (one) element.
That is to say, salt, baked clay, amber etc. are eidē gēs in the sense that they are
all placed closer to the ‘cold’ and ‘dry’ extremes than to the ‘hot’ and ‘moist’
extremes, but at somewhat different points along those continua than where
Aristotle would place truly simple and pure earth. It is also tempting to
think that such stuffs are closer along those continua to ‘genuine’ (or, rather:
‘theoretical’) earth than the dry exhalation is, and the same goes for forms of
water and the moist exhalation, since Aristotle never refers to the exhalations
as forms of earth, water etc.
The structure of the sublunary world is represented occasionally in
Aristotle and frequently in his commentators as a succession of four contiguous
strata, corresponding to the natural places of the so-called elements: earth in
the middle, surrounded by water, which in turn is surrounded by a layer of
air, the outermost layer being fire, which borders on the innermost celestial
sphere and thus on aithēr. Given the continuous movement of the heavenly
spheres and bodies (especially of the sun along the ecliptic circle) and their
effect on the sublunary realm,39 this model is obviously meant to radically
simplify a much more dynamic and wondrously messy structure. Large
portions of land rise above waters and the soil contains vast amounts of fire;
besides, the simple bodies go through various processes of generation and
destruction (most commonly and noticeably in the course of evaporation of
See 388a25–26: gēs eidē kai… hudatos; 382b11, 13: hudatos eidē; 383b13–14:
hudatos eidē.
37
	In the Timaeus the genē and eidē of earth etc. are differentiated according to the
variety of the elemental triangles (with respect to their sizes, presumably, not
their types) and the blending with other so-called elements in small quantities:
58c5, 58d3, 58d6, 60d, 82a.
38
E.g., in On Regimen: kinds or genē of earth, fire etc. are mentioned at IX.3; at X.1
we read about dry and moist water (these examples may refer to compounds,
though); at X.3, about the hottest and strongest fire; at XXXII.1, about the
lightest water and the most elusive fire; XXXII.2 – the strongest fire, the densest
water; XXXII.3 – the thickest water, the lightest fire etc.
39
On this, see, for example, Meteor. I.3 340b11–14.
36
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water into air and condensation of air or atmis into water, GC II.4) that make
this model appear all too schematic. The most volatile strata are, expectedly,
air and fire, and they are indeed responsible, in Aristotle’s meteorology, for
a large number of phenomena, ranging from shooting stars and meteors to
winds, rain and earthquakes. This picture is further complicated in the first
three books of the Meteorology, where Aristotle cautions us that ‘fire’ and
‘air’ make for a convenient but potentially misleading nomenclature when
applied to the stratification of the atmosphere. It turns out that ‘fire’ and ‘air’
are the causally unifying principle40 of virtually all meteorological processes
in so far as they are not exactly fire and air, but exhalations that come from
the earth when it is exposed to the sun’s rays.
I have mentioned before that there are two types of exhalations or
anathumiaseis, which form the subject of a detailed study in Meteor. I–III.
(1) There is a relatively cold and moist one, often referred to as atmis, which
comes about when the water on and in the soil is sufficiently warmed up and
which occupies roughly the lower half of the atmosphere or what we take
to be air41 (Aristotle subdivides it into several substrata, depending on the
content of humidity and on temperature). (2) The other type of exhalation
is brought about when the sun warms up the earth; it is smoky (kapnōdēs)42
and windy (pneumatōdēs), hot and dry, eminently combustible, and occupies
the upper (or outer) portion of the atmosphere. When these exhalations are
enclosed in the earth, the moist one is crucial in the production of metal
ore, whereas the dry one is necessary, as efficient and material cause, in the
formation of stones. The latter type is sometimes called simply ‘exhalation’,
anathumiasis (a term otherwise covering both exhalations) or ‘smoke’, kapnos
(a word normally designating only one of the various aspects of this type of
dry exhalation).43 We are told repeatedly44 that the two exhalations do not
Regarding his insistence on this unifying principle, see Meteor. II.9 370a26–33,
III.2 371b18–20 and III.3 372b12–15 (ho autos epi pantōn harmosei logos).
41
	In GC II, at 2, 330b5 Aristotle notes that air, being hot and moist, is like vapor
(or: a sort of vapor, hoion atmis gar ho aēr).
42
Echoes of this theory are possibly detectable not just in Meteor. IV, but also in
PA II; thus at 649a22–23, where he submits the hypothesis that the substratum
of fire is smoke and charcoal, charcoal becoming cold once the flame has been
extinguished, whereas smoke is always hot, ‘for smoke is an exhalation.’
43
Smoke consists of air and earth (GC II.4 331b24), which are presumably present
potentially in the composition of the dry exhalation.
44
Meteor. II.3 358a21–22, II.4 359b32–34, II.9 369a13–15; they are distinguished
according to whether they are predominantly, rather than purely, moist or dry.
40
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exist in pure state, a situation strikingly analogous to the simple bodies (see
GC I.10 and Meteor. IV.4 and 8).45
To return to my earlier point, although Aristotle uses ‘air’ (aēr) and ‘fire’
(pur) liberally to refer to the two main strata of the atmosphere, he lets us
know both implicitly (e.g., through the addition of hoion to pur: ‘quasi-fire’)
and explicitly that the outer layer is not quite fire and that what appears to
be air is not exactly air. Thus, at Meteor. I.3 340b20–32 he cautions us that the
outermost stratum under the moon is not really fire but a sort of fire (hoion
pur), since fire as we know it in its common manifestations is an excess of
heat and a kind of boiling. What makes this passage potentially confusing
is that Aristotle seems to refer to flames (i.e. fire as we experience it here,
around the center of the universe) as real fire, despite its apparently being
an excessive form of the simple body that envelops the other strata in our
sublunary world, whereas the outermost stratum in the sublunary world,
whose nature displays a certain balance and appears to be paradigmatic fire,
so to speak, is said to be fiery but not exactly fire.
A somewhat similar contrast is offered in GC II.3 (at 330b22 ff). Fire
(again, as we know it) is an excess of heat, whereas ice is an excess of
cold, freezing and boiling being types of excess (huperbolai, 330b27).46 The
implication here is likely that the truly simple bodies are somehow more
	It is notable that even aithēr, at least in the vicinity of the sphere of the moon
(see Meteor. I.3 340b6–10) and of the dry exhalation, is not as uniformly pure as
it might be taken to be in Aristotle.
46
Theophrastus too raises the issue of a confusion that people tend to indulge in all
too readily, namely the confusion between genuine and unmixed elements, on
the one hand, and mixtures that we call by convention ‘air’, ‘fire’ etc. Theophrastus’
remarks (e.g., in the first nine or so sections of his De Igne) are more tantalizing
than truly promising, as they are not followed up by a concentrated effort to
elucidate such confusions, but by vague references to other works or by reminders
of the limited scope of the enterprise at hand; one only wishes we still had
his treatise on the generation of elements. There are, however, interesting hints
at what Theophrastus would have to say on this matter. Fire, according to De
igne, cannot be an element proper, because its ontological condition is parasitic
upon some substrate – earth, water and air (mixed in various ratios, to be sure),
but Theophrastus wonders in passing about the possibility of a pure, unmixed
fire constituting the Sun and other celestial bodies. While I cannot get into a
detailed analysis of that aporia here, I should note that Bodnár (2002) comes
as close to explaining those very difficult segments (such as sections 4–6) as it
seems reasonably possible and contributes substantially to the discussion about
potential discrepancies between Theophrastus and the Stagirite, concluding
45
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moderate versions of what we take to be earth, water, air and fire (or rather
that the latter are exaggerations of the former). The truly simple bodies are
not fire, air etc., but fiery (puroeides), airy (aeroeides) and so on.47 Aristotle
adds that fire and earth, being at the periphery and at the center of the
sublunary sphere respectively, are most pure (eilikrinestata), whereas air
and water, being positioned between the other two bodies, are more mixed
(memigmena mallon). That air and water are ‘mixed’ seems to foreshadow the
Meteor. I discussion about exhalations, atmis – vapor or moist exhalation –
being a sort of hybrid, not quite pure water or pure air, except that in Meteor.
I the outermost layer in the sublunary world is the dry exhalation that is
both smoky (that is, earthy) and fiery, which does not fully square with the
claim in GC about the purity of fire, understood as the stuff that borders on
the aithēr.
All this may sound more perplexing than illuminating. Still, even if
Aristotle’s account of the relationship between the simple bodies and the
exhalations is fairly turbid, he provides sufficient clues for us to accept
that the exhalations are not somehow fundamentally different from the
four (sublunary) simple bodies. Let us consider this passage, at Meteor. I.3
340b24–27:
But we must understand that the part of what we call air [tou legomenou
aeros] which immediately surrounds the earth is moist and hot because
it is vaporous and contains exhalations from the earth, but that the part
above this is hot and dry. For vapor is naturally moist and cold and
exhalation hot and dry: and vapor is potentially like water, exhalation
like fire [kai estin atmis men dunamei hoion hudōr, anathumiasis de
dunamei hoion pur].
It is reasonably clear in this context that, while the exhalations are
somewhat different from water (and, we should add, air) and from fire, their
constitution is still close enough to the aforementioned simple bodies, so
that they have the capacity (dunamis) to be transformed into them under
the right conditions. The moist exhalation becomes water when it is cooled
down enough for the vapor to condense into water proper; the dry exhalation
becomes fire proper when its disposition to burst into flames is actualized.
Now, what exactly does it mean for, say, the dry exhalation to be close
in its constitution to fire without being fire proper? It does not appear to
plausibly that those discrepancies are not quite the gaping chasm that some
make them out to be.
47
	Here I agree with Joachim (1926), 217 and with Williams (1982), 161.
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stand quite in the same relationship to fire as, for example, air or earth
do in Aristotle’s various accounts of elemental transformation; otherwise,
he would have called the dry exhalation ‘air’ or ‘fire’ or maybe even ‘earth’,
or a combination of these, without much reservation or any qualification.
The dry exhalation emanates from the earth when the latter is heated up
by the sun; it is ‘smoky’ (kapnōdē, Meteor. I.4 341b10) and ‘windy’ but it is
also highly combustible (it is called hupekkauma or flammable stuff at I.4
341b19) and the heat produced as a result of the movement of the sun (and,
to a smaller degree, of the other heavenly bodies and spheres) easily ignites
the dry anathumiasis to give rise to presumably sublunary phenomena
such as shooting stars, comets and the like (Meteor. I.4 341b13–24; cf. I.3
340b12–14).
Olympiodorus’ comments on the nature of the exhalations are
particularly useful. In an attempt to argue for the continuity between
books I–III and book IV of the Meteorology, he takes the exhalations to be
intermediary (metaxu) stages in the mutual transformations of the so-called
elements (see, e.g., 16.15–22) or even intermediaries analogous to the socalled elements (at 314.16 ff. he notes that the smoky exhalation corresponds
to – analogei – earth and the vapor corresponds to water; cf. 319.11–12). At
266.20 ff. he writes that vapor, atmis, is in a way water: when condensed, vapor
reveals its watery (rather than airy) side; when not condensed, it is water in
potentiality, as it is made of finer particles (it is leptomeresteron)48 than actual
water (270.29).49 While this interpretation sounds remarkably sensible (and
48

49

Cf. Aristotle’s own use of leptomeres in GC II.2, at 330a2, in a discussion about
the emergence of new properties in a compound that comes about as a result
of mixis. For evidence of a corpuscularian view of matter in early Peripatetic
science and philosophy, see Theophrastus’ opuscula, especially his De Igne, e.g.,
sections 46 and 49, where the deployment of a quasi-technical terminology
including the adjectives leptomeres and mikromeres (literally, consisting of fine
or small parts) seems to underscore his interest in precisely such an approach to
the study of matter. I would not exclude the possibility that Theophrastus – who
made use of such features somewhat more consistently – might have influenced
Aristotle, rather than the other way around, but this can only remain a matter
of conjecture.
Olympiodorus seems to imply an unnecessarily corpuscular view of matter in
Aristotle’s natural philosophy, but this impression of flagrant misinterpretation
is mitigated if we consider Aristotle’s rather curious references to minuscule
masses (onkoi). Newman (2006), 13, 28, 65–68 and Chalmers (2009), 65–69 are
right to point out the discreet but quite real corpuscularian or granular aspect
of Aristotle’s theory of matter in Meteor. IV, since some of his explanations of
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seems supported by the fact that Aristotle presents the constitution of metals
and rocks both in terms of exhalations, in Meteor. III, and in terms of earth
and water or dry and moist, in Meteor. IV), given Aristotle’s treatment of the
exhalations in Meteor. I–III, it does not appear reconcilable with Aristotle’s
own firm objection (GC II.5 332a19–26) to the possibility that there might be
intermediaries between the four sublunary simple bodies.
Accordingly, a plausible answer, I believe, is that the dry exhalation
is quite simply earth in the process of becoming fire. In other words, it
should be placed in Aristotle’s table of elements, so to speak, somewhere
close to the ‘dry’ extreme along the continuum between moist and dry and
also somewhere closer to the ‘hot’ extreme than to the ‘cold’ one, along the
continuum between these two opposites. As for atmis or the moist exhalation,
it seems to be water in the process of becoming air (or the other way around,
as the case may be) and is thus to be placed close to the ‘moist’ extreme along
the dry-moist continuum and maybe rather close to the cold extreme along
the cold-hot continuum, but further away from ‘theoretical water’ than what
Aristotle calls the forms of water, eidē hudatos.

III. What accounts for the fact that certain
uniform stuffs consist, say, just of earth and still
have different dispositions?
My inquiry into the nature of the homoeomers has bearing on the emergence
of physical dispositions (i.e. dispositions that hinge partly on some particular
microstructure) as well. If it is indeed possible, according to Aristotle, that
there are different stuffs each made of one element (e.g., salt, baked clay,
amber and soda, each consisting only of earth), one may wonder what exactly
accounts for the fact that they have different properties (for instance, soda
is soluble, baked clay is not, 384b1–2). Part of the answer lies, I think, in my
previous comments: forms of earth and of water may be defined to some
extent according to where they are situated along the continua between hot
and cold, dry and moist. I would further propose, however, that we should
also look for an answer in their ‘physical’ – rather than merely ‘chemical’ –
constitution. Mostly in ch. 9 we are offered ample and detailed explanations
dispositional properties such as the combustibility of wood are explained in
terms of poroi or invisible channels of different types (arranged according to
different patterns in solid homoeomers), and of particles that can or cannot
enter such poroi.
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of the behavior of uniform stuffs centered on the notion of poroi50 or tiny
channels that pervade solid bodies. The microstructure of some stuff (which
is among its categorical properties – along with the ratio between its original
ingredients, and perhaps the amount and type of heat they contain etc.) can
be revealed by some of its dispositions and can implicitly account for those
dispositional differentiae. Soda, for instance is thoroughly pervaded by poroi
(385b23) – in a way in which baked clay is not – and this accounts for the fact
that soda is easily soluble in water.
It is noteworthy that the exact sequence or progression from primary
dunameis and elementary stuffs to homoeomers and implicitly to the
emergence of secondary or derivative dispositions is sometimes left to the
intuition of the reader of Meteor. IV, instead of being subjected to keen
analysis and overt explanations. In chs. 8–9, for instance, Aristotle describes
the (micro)structural characteristics (poroi of a certain diameter – allowing
water or only fire in etc.), arranged longitudinally or otherwise), which, along
with a certain chemical composition (e.g., predominance of earth), explain
some of the intrinsic dispositions listed there: fragility, flammability etc. We
can safely assume that the poroi and the interstices in most solid uniform
bodies are caused by thermic reactions, namely by the movements instigated
by internal or external heat (whether dry or moist), but exactly how that
is supposed to happen is nearly impossible to grasp with confidence for a
reader of Meteor. IV or is, at best, shrouded in a web of rather opaque hints.
Yet, upbraiding Aristotle for the insufficiency of his account could be a rather
misdirected exercise. He was certainly aware that his scientific antennae
could not possibly help him to provide complete and enlightening proofs for
every ‘chemical’ phenomenon and that he had to strike a balance, precarious
though it might have been, between observation and speculation. The thesis
that solid bodies are pervaded by invisible poroi is never quite demonstrated
in Meteor. IV, but the apparent plausibility of the inference (from the behavior
of fragile, splittable, flammable etc. bodies) that they contain such capillaries
seems to supplant the need for a more cogent proof. The text of Meteor. IV
8 and 9 shows little hesitation in invoking the poroi – a layer of explanatory
machinery additional to that of the elementary qualities.

50

On poroi (and a possible contradiction with GC I.8) and on the issue of
authorship, see, e.g., Lewis (1996), 3–9, Viano (2002), 71–72, Pepe (2002), 31–
33; for Aristotle’s own handling of poroi, see GC I.9 and Meteor. IV (especially
ch. 9).
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It is likely such a physical organization that could partly explain (together
with the position, so to speak, of the forms of earth and water along the
dry-moist and hot-cold continua) why different stuffs such as clay, soda, salt
etc., while consisting of only one element, can nonetheless exhibit different
qualities. It is a further question whether this might also explain why, say
earthenware or a lump of salt preserve their internal cohesion despite their
complete loss of water and, by the way, against the precepts put forth both in
GC II.8 and in Meteor. IV.4 and 10.51
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